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INTRODUCTION
International monetary policy practice shows that central
banks attempt to avoid extreme interest rate changes.
Looking at the past tendencies in the key interest rates of
major central banks (Chart 1), it is apparent that prime rates
– especially in the past decade and a half – have been fairly
stable over the short term, while interest rate changes have
been gradual over the long term, and that central banks have
aimed to change the direction of the interest rate cycles as
seldom as possible. While the Federal Reserve (Fed), which
serves as the American central bank, has always followed this
kind of strategy in the past, the Bank of England and the
central bank of Canada, for example, only adopted this type
of behaviour in the past decade and a half. Today, changes of
25 basis points have become prevalent, but from time to time,
when economic developments feature a sudden reversal, a
larger interest rate change is also possible. As Table 1
illustrates larger steps were taken more frequently to cut
interest rates which suggest that the growth of the economy
is more often affected by unpredictable events of great
importance (e.g. the capital markets crisis, 9/11).
The statistical properties of the interest rate series also reflect
the gradual approach taken by central banks. In most
countries, the autocorrelation of central bank interest rates is
considerable. This suggests that at any given time the interest
rate will be affected by the interest rate of the previous
period. Another interesting fact is that after an interest rate
change in a particular direction, the interest rate is 3-4 times
The interest rate policy of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank typically consists of taking several smaller steps in one direction. Other
central banks follow similar practices. Their interest rate policy actions are characterised by gradual changes: in other words,
they avoid sudden, major changes in interest rates and are wary of reversing interest rate cycles too frequently. This study will
present the theoretical background of the practice of such interest rate smoothing, the motivations of central banks as revealed
by their communication, and some important considerations for Hungarian monetary policy.
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1This indicator is the ratio of interest rate changes that reverse a cycle compared to all interest rate changes.
Sources: International Financial Statistics, Bank of England.
Interest autocorrelation Probability of a cycle reversal
1 Average interest rate hike Average interest rate cut
Federal Reserve 0.98 0.17 0.30 0.38
Bank of England 0.98 0.19 0.25 0.29
Bank of Canada 0.98 0.24 0.30 0.33
ECB (1999–2006) 0.98 0.18 0.31 0.39
Table 1
Statistical characteristics of central bank rates (1996-2006)
Sources: International Financial Statistics, Bank of England.
Chart 1
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United Kingdom more likely to change in the same direction, rather than in the
opposite direction. This indicates that central banks attempt
to avoid reversals in the interest rate cycle.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
OF INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
The theoretical literature identifies four major reasons for
gradual changes in interest rates, in other words interest rate
smoothing (see for example Bernanke, 2004; Blinder, 2005;
Rudebusch, 2006).
1. Macroeconomic uncertainty requires a more cautious and
a gradual approach to interest rate policy.
2.  Interest rate smoothing and less frequent reversals in
interest rate cycles help make monetary policy more
understandable and underscore the competence of the
central bank.
3. Interest rate smoothing contributes to financial stability.
4. As expectations regarding future interest rate changes have
an impact on the decisions that economic agents make
today, the economy may be stabilised with the help of
smaller, but more lasting interest rate changes.
The most important reason for interest rate smoothing is
macroeconomic uncertainty. Economic data are inaccurate,
data revisions are frequent, and the available analytical tools
are not sufficient to identify the economic shocks that drive
the behaviour of economic agents in ‘real time’. On the other
hand, monetary decision makers do not know in advance the
impact of an interest rate change on other macroeconomic
variables such as, for example, the exchange rate and the
price of assets, and therefore constant learning is required
until the optimal degree of monetary restriction or relaxation
can be determined. A seminal study by Brainard (1967)
demonstrated that if a decision maker is unsure about the
model that describes the economy and the impact its decision
will have on the economy, then – under certain parameter
restrictions – the optimal decision is to take smaller steps in
response to the information received, compared to when
circumstances are not uncertain.
2
It is important to note, however, that uncertainty does not
always justify a gradual change. If the uncertainty concerns
the persistence of inflation, for example, an optimal policy
would tend to take more aggressive steps than in the absence
of uncertainty. The reason is that this is how the central bank
reduces uncertainty about inflation in the future (Söderström,
2000). In addition, increased inflation persistence may
indicate that market players are not fully convinced by the
central bank’s commitment to price stability. The later the
central bank responds, the higher the real costs the central
bank will incur when it attempts to re-establish its credibility.
The second advantage of interest rate smoothing is that it
helps to reduce the frequency of cycle reversals. If cycle
reversals are too frequent, communication becomes more
difficult and public opinion may call into question the
competence of the central bank.
3 Frequent changes in interest
rate cycles are also undesirable if we wish to understand how
the economy operates (see, for example, Ellison, 2006), as
they prevent the central bank and other market participants
from learning about the monetary transmission mechanism.
The third advantage of interest rate smoothing is that it
enables monetary policy to have a stronger impact on interest
rate expectations and on long-term yields. Interest rate policy
affects economic activity – including decisions to invest,
consume and save – primarily by way of long-term interest
rates rather than the prime rate. The relationship between the
two is based on the expectation hypothesis of the yield curve
according to which long-term yields are an average of short-
term yields that are expected in the future. Therefore, if an
interest rate change is considered to be long-lasting or if
additional changes are expected in the future, long-term
yields will change to a greater extent because the interest rate
change is understood as the first step in an interest rate cycle.
The impact on long-term interest rates may lead to a more
favourable economic trajectory via two channels.
One is based on the assumption that interest smoothing can
achieve the desired macroeconomic effect via lower
fluctuation in the prime rate. This is because different shocks
often change inflation in opposite directions. In such cases, a
monetary policy featuring interest rate smoothing does not
have to complete interest rate cycles on the basis of newly
received information; however, long-term interest rates
undergo the necessary changes. Smaller fluctuations in short-
term interest rates are of value primarily for the purpose of
stability. Banks’ funds usually have shorter terms than their
placements. Therefore, a gradual change in short-term
interest rates has a stabilising effect on banks’ profits because
it enables them to adapt to changes in their financing costs
(Cukierman, 1991).
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2This consequence of uncertainty, and the fact that uncertainty requires gradual action, was later also demonstrated in a different model framework. Martin (1999) had
similar results in the new Keynesian model framework. Martin adds that those parameter values in respect of which Brainard’s results are not valid do not appear to
be realistic on the basis of empirical evidence.
3 According to Meyer (2004), for example, this consideration was of key importance for Greenspan, the previous chairman of the Fed.According to the second consideration, described by
Woodford (1998), it is not interest rate smoothing but the
long-term nature of changing of interest rates that matters.
Due to forward expectations, inflation and output do not
depend on current monetary conditions alone, but also on
future monetary policy action. Therefore, a more favourable
result will be achieved if the central bank is capable of
influencing long-term interest rate expectations as well. If
market players expect the currently optimal interest
conditions to be lasting, a smaller initial interest rate change
may be sufficient to stabilise the economy.
However, the central bank can only influence expectations if
it is credibly committed to an interest rate trajectory. This
means that the central bank cannot re-optimise its policy at
each moment, as it must take into account its past decisions
(history-dependent). Accordingly, a commitment may
narrow the central bank’s options over the short run, but
overall the central bank will be more successful in stabilising
the economy, because expectations can be managed more
effectively.
MODELLING THE CENTRAL BANK’S
ACTIONS: IS INTEREST RATE
SMOOTHING INTENTIONAL?
If we wish to model the actions of the central bank, it is
important to decide why interest rate smoothing occurs and
whether or not it is intentional. If the central bank’s actions
are influenced by financial stability considerations, after a
larger shock the central bank will execute only a portion of
the necessary interest rate change and finish up – provided
that the central bank’s outlook is not modified by new
information – later, in several smaller steps. If the central
bank’s objective is to influence expectations and to formulate
a persistent interest rate trajectory (à la Woodford), the
central bank will respond to a shock immediately, but will
take into account its previous commitments when
determining the optimal approach. Therefore, interest rate
smoothing is not a result of future action, but rather of past
action. Finally, some people believe that interest rate
smoothing is not intentional but is caused by the dynamics of
the economic variables and/or uncertainty as described by
Brainard and a constant learning process about economic
processes. In this approach the central bank, in every one of
its decisions, immediately changes the interest rate to what is
considered to be the optimal level at the time. However, the
unfolding of macroeconomic processes and a better
knowledge of their nature results in a more persistent interest
rate trajectory.
Empirical studies of the central bank’s interest rate smoothing
are generally based on the logic of financial stability: a new
argument is added to the central bank’s traditional loss
function
4 to penalise interest rate fluctuations. The logic of
estimating the central bank’s so-called reaction functions or the
interest rate rules is similar. These studies are based on the
primary hypothesis that the central bank adapts to the
fundamentally justifiable interest rate level only gradually.
Most often the fundamental interest rate is a function of
inflation and the output gap (in the literature this is referred to
as the ‘Taylor rule’). The actual change in the interest rate can
be estimated on the basis of a partial adjustment equation, as a
function of the fundamental interest rate and the lagged
interest rate. The coefficient of the lagged interest rate (ρ) was
regarded as the parameter of interest rate smoothing. Most of
these studies were written to describe the actions of the Fed
and resulted in a rather high smoothing parameter of
approximately 0.7-0.9.
5 Hidi (2006) performed similar
calculations in respect of Hungary, the results of which
indicated a similar level of interest rate persistence (0.6-0.8).
The above approach was widely criticised, because in practice
the high autocorrelation of interest rates can be caused by
several factors in addition to intentional smoothing.
Rudebusch (2002 and 2006), for example, called attention to
the fact that the results are similar if the central bank, when
making its decision, takes into account criteria other than
growth and inflation and for a longer period of time (e.g.
stability considerations). Rudebush also proposes an
alternative method for measuring intentionality on the basis
of money market information. If the central bank’s gradual
changes were intentional, forward yields would be easy to
predict. In the case of the USA, the prime interest rate cannot
be predicted with sufficient certainty for a period longer than
3 months; consequently, interest rate smoothing is not
intentional in the interpretation based on money markets.
With regard to the Bank of England, Goodhart (2004) also
came to the conclusion that smoothing is not intentional. In
the study he estimated the reaction function of the Bank of
England and found that the central bank does not react to
current inflation, but to a deviation from the target of the
inflation forecast, that is, π
∼
t+2. In this approach, interest rate
changes do not exhibit smoothing. However, we must
underline that in most cases the central bank’s forecasting
practice contains smoothing. As forecasters face the same
uncertainty as decision makers when evaluating freshly
received macroeconomic variables, they too only gradually
incorporate the impact of new information into their
forecasts.
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4The most popular form of the central bank’s loss function can be expressed as the discounted present value of the square sum of the deviation from the inflation target
and the fluctuation in the output gap. In certain models this corresponds to the welfare function of the representative household.
5 See Amato and Laubach, 1999, Clarida et al., 2000.The latest method of modelling the central bank’s behaviour
is based on estimates by the so-called stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models.
6 These models do not assume the
central bank’s target function which penalises interest rate
volatility and but do take into account the persistence of
shocks to the economy. Nevertheless, the estimated
parameter of the lagged interest rate in the central bank’s
target function is high. In this model framework the welfare
impact is primarily caused by the ‘Woodford’ channel that
pertains to the predictability of future interest rates.
INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING AND
COMMUNICATION BY CENTRAL BANKS
In the previous chapter we have seen that empirical
approaches cannot accurately grasp the motivation behind
the generally observed interest rate smoothing behaviour of
central banks. Therefore, in this chapter we will examine
communication by central banks in order to explore the
assumptions behind gradual interest rate changes. This study
will only focus on tools that guide longer-term interest
expectations and will not analyse communication aimed at
smoothing market interest rates over the very short term.
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The direct statements of central bank chairmen are not
equivocal. In an earlier study Bernanke, the current chairman
of the Fed, claimed that American monetary policy smoothes
interest rates intentionally (Bernanke, 2004). However,
according to Poole, another member of the Fed’s decision-
making body, future interest rate changes are based almost
exclusively on newly received information, that is, if interest
rate changes are gradual, it is not because of intentional interest
rate smoothing (Poole, 2003). Similarly to Poole, King, the
chairman of the Bank of England, claims that the central bank
always makes a new decision in light of new information (King,
2006). Goodhart, a former member of the decision-making
body of the Bank of England, denies having regularly voted
together with his colleagues on smaller steps than were
necessary to attain the inflation target (Goodhart, 2004).
Despite this statement, we have found evidence of intentional
interest rate smoothing in the minutes of the Bank of England.
The minutes of the interest rate decision often point out that
uncertainty requires cautious measures in monetary policy. In
one case, the minutes specifically state that although a 50 basis
point increase would have been necessary due to the inflation
forecast, yet they decided to take several smaller steps due to
the uncertainty and to the danger of sending the wrong
message by changing the size of a step.
In addition to the statements made by central bank officials,
the forward communication of central banks may also yield
information about expectations concerning future interest
rates and therefore about the assumptions that underlie
interest rate smoothing. In the inflation targeting system, one
of the key tasks of monetary policy is to influence
expectations; therefore, the practice of each inflation
targeting central bank has forward components. An accepted
tool for orienting interest rate expectations is the so-called
fan chart
8 which, in addition to the basic trajectory of
inflation forecast, also indicates the uncertainty faced by
decision makers in respect of future developments in
inflation and growth. The fan chart sends a message about
future interest rate changes: if the likelihood of inflation in
excess of the target is high, monetary tightening can be
expected. At the same time, it also demonstrates the
‘Brainard’ uncertainty: decision makers need additional
information and learning to be able to formulate a more
accurate picture of the future trajectory of the economy and
to determine the appropriate monetary policy.
A policy bias or code words regarding the nature of future
interest rate changes may fulfil a similar function. This type
of forward communication is also exercised by non-inflation
targeting central banks as well. Similarly to the fan chart, the
policy bias is generally preceded by enumeration and
evaluation of the risk factors impacting inflation (‘verbal fan
chart’), as a result of which the direction of future interest
rate changes is determined. In this communication
framework, the policy gradualism is also motivated by
learning and uncertainty, which highlights that the
commitment to the bias is always contingent.
Some inflation targeting central banks only use the fan chart
(e.g. the Bank of England), while others help interpret the fan
chart by making direct references to the direction, or perhaps
the pace, of expected interest rate changes. The central bank
may help calibrate expected interest rate changes if the
inflation forecast and/or the fan chart are based on the
assumption that the prime rate will follow the trajectory set
by forward market rates. In this case, the fan chart and/or the
bias can be evaluated by comparing them to the interest rate
changes that are expected by the market, which allows much
more freedom in fine-tuning expectations.
The practice of inflation targeting banks that also publish an
interest rate trajectory which is considered acceptable by
the central bank (so-called endogenous interest rate
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
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6 See e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003.
7The most widespread type of short-term tool is verbal intervention, used by several central banks, which attempts to orient money market expectations about future
interest rate changes especially between interest decision sessions. In these cases, the purpose of communication is to help the markets evaluate the events that occur
between sessions and the responses of the central bank to these events. In respect of verbal intervention see Pintér et al., 2006.
8This interpretation of the fan chart is possible only if the inflation forecast and the inflation report reflects the assessment of the Monetary Council.trajectory) in respect of the time period for which a forecast
is made (e.g. the central banks of New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden and Iceland) represents a higher level of orienting
interest rate expectations. These interest rate trajectories
are generally ‘smooth’ and change monetary conditions in
slow, gradual cycles. The Norwegian central bank has been
most specific in what it regards as a ‘good’ interest
trajectory.
9
1. The interest rate should be set with a view to stabilising
inflation close to the target over the medium term. The
horizon will depend on the disturbances to which the
economy is exposed and the effects on the prospects for
the inflation path and the real economy.
2. The interest rate path should provide a reasonable balance
between the path for inflation and the path for capacity
utilisation.
3.  Interest rate developments should result in acceptable
developments in inflation and output also under
alternative, albeit not unrealistic assumptions concerning
the economic situation and the functioning of the
economy.
4. Interest rate adjustments should normally be gradual and
consistent with the Bank’s previous response pattern.
5.  As a cross-check for interest rate setting, it should be
possible to explain any substantial and systematic
deviations from simple monetary policy rules.
Criterion 4 clearly states the need to change the interest rate
gradually. At the same time, based on Criterion 2, it is clear
that the future developments in inflation and the output gap
must also be taken into account when determining the
interest rate trajectory, therefore the persistence of macro
variables enhances the gradual changing of interest rates.
Criterion 5 also enhances interest rate smoothing because the
endogenous interest rate trajectory is also compared to the
Taylor-type rules, which contain explicit interest rate
smoothing.
Finally, we would like to note that sometimes central banks
are also expected to ensure a low volatility of interest rates.
For example, according to the definition by the New Zealand
central bank, the objective of monetary policy is to ensure the
stability of prices in general and to avoid unnecessary
fluctuations in output, interest rates and the exchange rate.
Overall, on the basis of the forward communication of
central banks, gradual interest rate changes are based
primarily on the ‘Brainard’ uncertainty, i.e. continuous
learning about economic processes, while at the same time
the intention to moderate interest rate volatility sometimes
appears to be genuinely beneficial. However, we do not have
any information as to whether it is based on the ‘Woodford’
type persistent interest rate policy or considerations related
to financial stability.
INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING IN
HUNGARY
In this chapter, we examine the interest rate policy of the
Magyar Nemzeti Bank in the period after inflation targeting
was introduced. First, we wish to describe the past 6 years in
respect of the gradualism in interest rate changes and the
prevalence of smoothing the prime rate. We then examine
the motivation behind keeping interest rate changes gradual
on the basis of the central bank’s forward looking
communication.
The extent of interest rate changes made by the Hungarian
central bank and the changes in interest rate cycles are greatly
determined by the structural characteristics of the Hungarian
economy:
1.  Transitional economies experience more frequent and
greater shocks than developed economies (Benczúr and
Rátfai, 2005), while the mechanisms that facilitate smooth
adjustment of the economy are weaker (large share of
liquidity constrained households, weak automatic
stabilisers in the budget).
2. The Hungarian economy has a long history of inflation,
and due to the legacy of high inflation expectations,
interest rate smoothing may have been constrained by
weaker credibility of the central bank’s disinflationary
policy.
3. The MNB, similarly to central banks in other transitional
economies, has faced high macroeconomic uncertainty.
Due to the short span of the available data series and the
structural changes in the economy, the uncertainty of
models describing the economy is greater than usual.
4. The exchange rate plays an important role in monetary
policy, because the most important real effect of monetary
policy action comes through the exchange rate channel.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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9These criteria are always listed in the Norwegian report on inflation as a framed message within the section that describes the Monetary Council’s interest rate
trajectory. The first two criteria, the extent of shocks and the issue of
credibility, point towards lower scale interest rate smoothing,
while Criterion 3 supports interest rate smoothing on the basis
of the Brainard logic. The importance of the exchange rate is
not unequivocal for interest rate smoothing. On the one hand,
for inflation processes, only permanent changes in the
exchange rate count; and the central bank must only respond
to permanent changes in the risk premium. Because – ex ante
– it is very difficult to say how permanent exchange rate
changes will be, the key role of the exchange rate may provide
an incentive for a gradual monetary policy reaction. Smaller
changes in the interest rate may also moderate exchange rate
and interest rate speculation. This is because money market
players with considerable market weight can build speculative
positions if the central bank reacts to exchange rate
fluctuations quickly and with considerable interest rate
changes. On the other hand, however, we can also argue for a
more aggressive response to the exchange rate. If on the basis
of their past experience market players expect exchange rate
changes to be lasting, this may enhance the pass-through of
exchange rate changes to inflation. Consequently, the central
bank will be able to moderate the tightness of exchange rate
management only gradually as market players learn to live with
exchange rate fluctuations. This is the assumption behind the
fact that in small, open, inflation targeting countries a decrease
in the exchange rate pass-through parameter has become an
important indicator of the central bank’s credibility.
Due to the specific aspects of the Hungarian economy, small,
open and less developed countries provide a better basis for
comparison than large, developed countries. We selected
three countries that are leaders in the practice of inflation
targeting and have extensive experience in this respect (New
Zealand, Chile and Israel). According to Table 2, the
autocorrelation of the interest rates in these countries are
somewhat lower than in large, developed countries. In
respect of the likelihood of cycle reversals, results are only
partially comparable because we do not have available a time
series of the same length as in the case of developed
countries. Overall, in these countries cycle reversals are not
more frequent.
Another indicator of the importance of interest rate
smoothing is the average size of interest rate changes. Table
3 shows that in small inflation targeting countries, the
average extent of interest rate change is somewhat larger than
in more developed countries (Table 1). It should be
underlined that the asymmetry in this case is the opposite.
While the central banks of developed countries make faster
and more resolute interest rate correction moves downward,
small countries tend to do the same in an upward direction.
A higher-than-average increase in interest rate may be
explained by an outstanding interest rate hike or a series of
hikes due to a sudden weakening in exchange rates or a crisis-
like situation. However, in quiet periods the normal extent of
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
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Sources: Central bank websites.
Autocorrelation of interest rates Likelihood of cycle reversals
New Zealand 0.98 0.13
Chile 0.96 0.33
Israel 0.98 0.12
Hungary (2001–September 2007) 0.96 0.17
Table 2
Autocorrelation of the central bank’s interest rates and the likelihood of cycle reversals in small inflation
targeting economies (1999–September 2007)
Sources: Central bank websites.
Average interest  Interest rate hike  Interest rate cut
rate change
average mode average mode
New Zealand 0.27 0.28 0.25 -0.25 -0.25
Chile 0.42 0.39 0.25 -0.44 -0.25
Israel 0.40 0.60 0.25 -0.35 -0.25
Hungary 0.56 0.90 0.50 -0.44 -0.50
Table 3
Extent of interest rate changes by the central banks of small inflation targeting economies 
(1999–September 2007)interest rate change, similarly to developed countries, is 25
basis points
10 (see Chart 2).
During the past 6 years the persistence of the Hungarian
prime rate has been rather similar to that of peer countries.
The largest changes in the interest rate occurred in 2003 in
response to a speculative attack against the exchange rate
band and in relation to the exchange rate drops in the course
of the year. This is in line with the experience of other small,
open countries and the conclusions of the theoretical
literature according to which the optimal response to a
weakening of the central bank’s credibility is a firm reaction
by the central bank, and smoothing of interest rates is not an
option (Söderstorm, 2000). At the same time, for the MNB
the normal step was also larger. While in the other small
countries the typical extent of the change was 25 basis points,
in Hungary it was 50 basis points.
In the first years after inflation targeting was introduced, the
lessening of exchange rate fluctuations played a key role in
the interest rate policy of the MNB. Up until 2001-2003 the
central bank attempted to orient short-term exchange rate
expectations by announcing exchange rate comfort zones
which were compatible with the attainment of the inflation
target. Starting from 2004, the central bank no longer
commented directly on changes in the exchange rate, but the
effect of exchange rate changes that proved to be long-term
were incorporated into inflation forecasts and therefore
interest rate policy was indirectly impacted.
11
An increase in the central bank’s exchange rate tolerance
created an opportunity for a more extensive smoothing of
interest rates. This change is also apparent in yield and
exchange rate volatility changes. The fluctuation of the
exchange rate grew, the fluctuation of short-term yields fell
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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10The optimal extent of exchange rate changes is also affected by the frequency of interest rate decisions. International practice is not uniform in this respect. The
European Central Bank has a rate-setting meeting every month, while the central banks of other developed countries typically meet less often (the Fed: 8 meetings,
the Swedish central bank: 6 meetings). In less developed countries, the Monetary Councils meet more often; in Chile and Israel interest rate decision meetings are
held on a monthly basis similarly to Hungary, in New Zealand, however, there are only 8 such meetings.
11 In addition, when the exchange rate was close to the edge of the band, the announcements started to include statements related to the risk premium due to the
direct management of the exchange rate.
Sources: Central bank websites. Source: MNB.
Chart 2
Changes in central bank prime rates in the small
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Policy rate (right-hand scale)
Exchange rate 3 months 6 months 1 year 3 year 5 year
2001–Sep. 2007 0.46 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.30
2001–2002 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.27
2004–Sep. 2007 0.47 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.27
Table 4
Exchange rate and interest rate volatility*
* Average of 90 day volatilities.
Source: MNB.considerably, but there was no significant change in the
behaviour of the time series over longer horizons. This
indicates that the reason for the changed tendency of interest
rate changes is not only a change in the nature of the shocks,
but stronger interest rate smoothing activity by the central
bank as well.
In the period since inflation targeting was introduced there
were two longer interest rate reduction periods which were
followed by two shorter interest rate hike periods. Currently,
the market is expecting interest rate cuts again. The reasons
behind the gradual changes in the interest rate can be further
explained by the central bank’s forward communication.
Over the past six years, most interest rate changes were
preceded by an indication by the central bank, either in the
form of a fan chart or a policy bias. However, there were
periods when in the series of interest rate changes of a
particular direction were motivated by a series of shocks of
the same direction.
As to forward looking communication, the past six years can
be broken down into two periods. The first one lasted until
the end of 2003 during which time the MNB published its
inflation forecast on a quarterly basis. The fan chart in the
forecast reflected the risk perceptions of the Monetary
Council, and in connection with the fan chart the Council
also formulated a policy bias in respect of the direction of
interest rate changes. In those decision-making sessions
where there were no inflation report publications, the
Council only provided an uninformative statement on the
rate decision.
Between the middle of 2001 and the end of 2003, 10
inflation reports and related statements were published. On
six of these occasions the direction of interest rate change
indicated by the Council and the actual interest rate changes
until the next report were of the same direction. In the rest
of the cases the exchange rate change, which is not listed
among the risks in the conditional forecast prepared by the
MNB, altered the intended direction of monetary policy.
From 2004, the inflation report was issued as a staff report
and the Monetary Council did not provide a regular policy
bias related to the fan chart. At the same time, the
announcements issued by the Monetary Council became
more substantive, giving a detailed description of the
Council’s assessment of economic processes.
In this period, we can only compare the skewness of the fan
chart and the interest rate changes which were made in the
following quarter. During this period, the skewness of the
fan chart and the direction of the interest rate change was
in harmony for 9 out of the 15 inflation reports.
12 There
must have been a series of surprises that caused such
conflicting messages in 2005. During this period,
international risk premiums fell considerably, and stronger
competition in the product market and the persistently low
level of core inflation may have contributed to the series of
interest rate cuts.
On the other hand, in 2004 and starting from the end of
2006, there was a foreseeable discrepancy between the fan
chart and the forthcoming interest rate changes. Both of these
were related to the fact that the market harboured different
expectations regarding the simultaneous change in interest
rates and the exchange rate than was indicated in the
assumptions of the inflation report with respect to the
interest rate and exchange rate, which were fixed at the
previous month’s level.
In 2004, while preparing the inflation forecast, the staff did
not take into account that entry into the EU will result in
considerable disinflation due to increasingly strong
competition; therefore it forecasted higher inflation than
eventually occurred. At the same time, considerable
strengthening of the forint resulted in a significant tightening
in monetary conditions and therefore there was no need for
additional interest rate hikes. Starting from 2004, the
Monetary Council did not provide a policy bias, but
reference was made to the expected interest rate trajectory in
the form of ‘code words.’ The typical message of the period
was a reference to the need for ‘cautious’ interest policy: the
fragility of consolidation and the macroeconomic imbalance
justified only a gradual decline in interest rates. In the first
half of 2004, market players in fact priced in steeper interest
rate cuts than actually happened, and the message of the
central bank helped the market learn about the interest rate
smoothing behaviour of the central bank.
At the end of 2006, the situation was similar to the beginning
of 2004: while the inflation fan charts indicated an upside
risk, the market planned for an interest rate cut. This was in
line with the Council’s opinion that, due to an improvement
in macroeconomic equilibrium, the interest premium
expected from investments in forint would gradually fall and
consequently the monetary conditions of a disinflation
trajectory may be ensured even if the prime rate is lower. The
Council also indicated this to market players in the form of
an interest rate policy bias. However, these assumptions –
which were proven ex post – did not find their way into the
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12 We interpreted the fan chart as an indicator of interest rate hike/interest rate cut if compared to the target the fan chart was oblique, that is, the probability of a
higher/lower inflation than the target was higher/lower.fan chart, which was based on the technical assumption of a
fixed interest rate and exchange rate. Nevertheless, the fan
chart provided useful information for the market in respect
of the expected interest rate change. The upside risk to the
baseline scenario may have indicated to the market that the
interest rate decline will be much slower than expected.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, in the past six years the uncertainty related to
the nature and course of the shocks and the impact of
monetary decisions on the economy called for gradual
interest rate changes by the MNB, and this is primarily what
caused the interest rate cycles which were observed. In
addition to continuous learning about economic processes,
the projected interest rate trajectory was most often altered
by changes in the exchange rate.
Despite the uncertainty and the unforeseeable shocks, inflation
forecasts and the Monetary Council’s interest rate indications
helped form interest rate expectations. The fan chart indicated
the risk factors which influenced the decisions of the Monetary
Council, facilitating the learning process amongst market
participants. At the same time, however, when there was a
significant discrepancy between the exchange rate and the
interest rate trajectory expected by the market on the one hand
and the presupposed fixed interest rate and fixed exchange rate
in the inflation report on the other hand, the information
content of the fan chart’s message regarding the interest rate
was significantly reduced. In such cases, the Monetary
Council’s forward communication regarding expected
developments in the exchange rate and the interest rate
trajectory is of key importance.
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